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W'illiam Jo h n so n  moved to New York from his ancestral hom eland Ireland in  1738 and 
soon becam e one of the m ost in fluential and  
p rosperous colonists of h is tim e. As a  trader, 
lan d  developer, sp e cu la to r  an d  governm ent 
official, he co-operated extensively with the tribes 
of th e  S ix  N a tio n s  Iro q u o is  C o n fed eracy . 
C onsidered a fair an d  h o n es t m an  by these  
people, Jo h n so n  developed close personal and  
econom ic re la tio n sh ip s  w ith  m any  of them , 
especially w ithin the M ohawk tribes. So w hen 
the B ritish  and  F rench  clashed  betw een 1744 
and  1748 (King George’s War), the New York 
colonial governm ent tu rn ed  to Johnson .
T hrough h is  work as the official agen t in 
charge of supplying the  trad ing  post a t Oswego 
and  as the governm ent’s Indian agent, Jo h n so n  
becam e know n as an  influential en trep ren eu r 
and  broker of Indian  affairs. Indeed, Governor 
George C linton of New York did n o t delegate 
au thority  to Jo h n so n  based  on his prom ise as a 
m ilitary leader; Jo h n so n ’s ac tu a l m ilitary role 
during  King George’s War w as m inim al. On the 
contrary, h is duties included supplying Oswego 
w ith s to res an d  m anpow er, sending, b u t no t 
a c c o m p a n y in g , in f r e q u e n t  a n d  o f te n  
unsuccessful Iroquois raiding parties against the 
F rench, an d  acting  as a  conduit betw een the 
Iroquois and  the B ritish  colonial governm ent.
W hen the final clash between the British and 
French in North America began in 1755, colonial 
officials once again turned  to Johnson  -  this time 
to g a th e r Iroquois su p p o rt for the  B ritish  w ar 
effort. D esp ite  h is  lack  of fo rm al m ilita ry  
training, his apparently  unrivaled influence with
the Iroquois Confederacy and  his familiarity with 
the  region w hich could facilitate the  supply  of 
an  arm y led the B ritish  colonial governm ent to 
com m ission him  to lead a  m ilitary expedition 
against the F rench  in 1755.
However, as the  com m ander of the  Crown 
Point expedition force in  1755, an d  la te r as  the 
in terim  com m ander of the  siege aga inst Fort 
N iagara in  1759, Jo h n so n  failed to a ttra c t and  
m ain ta in  significant m ilitary  su p p o rt from  the 
Iroquois n a tio n s . A lthough h is to r ia n s  have 
c o n s is te n tly  p o rtra y ed  J o h n s o n  as  a g rea t 
m ilitary leader b ased  on h is perform ance in 
th e s e  tw o b a t t le s  a g a in s t  F re n c h  fo rc e s  
descending  from C anada, h is inexperience in 
m ilitary affairs an d  h is  inability  to ob tain  the 
full su p p o rt of B rita in ’s Iroquois allies raise  
doubts abou t h is ability as  a  m ilitary leader.1 In 
the final analysis, Jo h n so n ’s close rela tionsh ip  
with the Iroquois nations during the Seven Years 
War (1755-1763) did no t resu lt in their effective 
or consequential participation in two of the m ost 
significant B ritish  victories against the French. 
Therefore, h is legacy as a great m ilitary leader 
res ts  on dub ious foundations.
By 1754 it w as clear th a t an o th e r m ajor 
conflict betw een the B ritish  an d  the  F rench  
w ould  soon  e ru p t. A ttem pting  to u n ite  the  
colonies and  gain the allegiance of the Iroquois, 
colonial officials organized m eetings in  Albany 
in J u n e  an d  Ju ly  1754. The B ritish  agreed to 
fortify the Iroquois frontier against fu ture French 
incu rsions an d  “the  Ind ians agreed to fu rn ish  
a t least one th o u sa n d  braves to be u sed  for 
general service.” In addition, 600 m ore would
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be raised  for the pro tection  of Oswego.2 This 
prom ise of s trong  Iroquois su p p o rt w as m ade 
in  sp ite  of the  fac t th a t  only 150 Iroquois 
a t t e n d e d  th e  m e e tin g , w ith  M ohaw k  
rep resen ta tio n  dom inating .3 U nfortunately  for 
the  B ritish  th e  sm all an d  u n rep re sen ta tiv e  
Iroquois delegation seem ed to ind icate  th a t the 
m ajority  of the  Iroquois n a tio n s  h a d  adop ted  a 
neu tra l s tance.4
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all o thers  w hatsoever are  strictly  requ ired  and  
e n jo in e d  to  c e a se  a n d  fo rb e a r  a c tin g  or 
in term eddling there in .”7
On the  sam e day B raddock’s second-in- 
com m and  a n d  G overnor of M a ssa c h u se tts  
William Shirley inform ed Jo h n so n  of h is new 
com m ission  as  co m m an d er of the  p lan n e d  
expedition aga in st the  French fort a t Crown 
Point. Jo h n so n  initially proposed destroying the 
fort w ith a  force com posed entirely of Iroquois, 
an  ind ication  of h is belief in  h is ex traord inary  
influence over the Indian nations.8 According to 
the battle  p lans devised a t Alexandria, however, 
Jo h n so n  w ould lead an  arm y of approxim ately 
4400  m en raised  by the governm ents of New 
York, New H am psh ire , C o n n ec ticu t, Rhode 
Island , an d  M a ssa c h u se tts , a s  well as any  
n u m b er of Ind ians he could rec ru it.9 Jo h n so n  
invited m em bers of the Iroquois Confederacy to 
M ount Jo h n so n  betw een 21 J u n e  an d  4 Ju ly  
1755, where they discussed issues related to the 
upcom ing B ritish  cam paign. According to the 
m in u tes  of the  conference 1,106 Indian  m en, 
w om en a n d  c h ild re n  a tte n d e d , “a g re a te r  
n u m b e r ...th a n  were ever before know n a t any 
pub lic  m eeting .”10 After delivering a  speech  
in tended  to revive m em ories of p a s t F rench  
atrocities perpetrated  against the Indian nations 
of the region, Jo h n so n  stated:
Soon after h is arrival in  N orth Am erica as 
th e  new  C o m m a n d e r-in -C h ie f  of B r i ta in ’s 
colonial forces, G eneral E dw ard  B raddock5 
recognized J o h n s o n ’s po ten tia l value in  the 
upcom ing cam paign against the French. On 16 
April 1755 a t the Alexandria military conference, 
B raddock
a p p o i n t e d  C o lo n e l  J o h n s o n  to  b e  S o le  
S u p e r in te n d e n t  o f th e  In d ia n s  of th e  F ive 
N ations, w ith  In s tru c t io n s  to  engage a s  la rge  a  
N u m b er of th e m  a s  h e  co u ld  for h is  M ajesty 's  
Service in  th e  E x p ed itio n  a g a in s t C row n Poin t, 
N iagara, a n d  th e  F re n c h  F o rts  u p o n  th e  O hio .6
B raddock ordered Jo h n so n  to “trea t and  confer 
w ith them  [Iroquois] as often an d  upon  su ch  
m atters as you [Johnson] shall judge necessary.” 
Ind ian  affairs in the n o rth e rn  B ritish  colonies 
would be the  sole prerogative of Jo h n so n , “and
My w ar k e ttle  is o n  th e  Fire, m y C anoe is read y  
to  p u t  in  th e  w ater, m y G u n  is loaded, m y sw ord 
is by  m y side, a n d  m y axe is sh a rp e n e d . I desire  
a n d  expect you will now  take  u p  th e  H atche t an d  
jo in  u s , your B re th ren  ag a in s t all o u r E n em ies.11
Five days later the Indian nations answ ered 
J o h n so n ’s call to a rm s by prom ising to jo in  the 
British cam paign against the F rench.12 However, 
within a week the alliance started  to show cracks. 
On 3 Ju ly  the  Cayuga S achem s told Jo h n so n  
th a t they wished to avoid meeting their Canadian 
co u sin s , th e  C aughnaw aga  In d ian s , in  the  
upcom ing expedition ag a in st Crown P o in t.13 
Jo h n so n  prom ised to send  rep resen ta tives to 
m eet with the Caughnawaga Indians and request 
th ey  rem ain  n e u tra l. Even J o h n s o n ’s m ost 
reliable Indian allies, the M ohawks, ignored his 
in itia l re q u e s t for w arrio rs . In sp ite  of the  
reluctance of the Iroquois to comm it fully to the
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B ritish  cause  Jo h n so n  moved h is expedition 
forw ard, su perv is ing  in itia l p re p a ra tio n s  in  
Albany.
T hus far Jo h n so n ’s only m ilitary experience 
“w as as paym aster of Indian w arriors who lived 
off the land, s tru c k  suddenly  a t vulnerable and  
unsu sp ec tin g  targets, an d  th en  m elted into the 
w oods, defending  n o th in g .” However in  the  
upcom ing cam paign J o h n so n ’s objective “was 
derived from conventional E uropean  w arfare; 
the m eans had  to be conventional, and  the m en 
m u st try  to be like reg u la rs .”14 To com pensate  
for h is  lac k  of m ilita ry  t ra in in g  J o h n s o n  
recruited highly skilled officers. One such  officer, 
Captain William Eyre, was designated as artillery 
engineering head, quarterm aster, and ad ju tan t.15 
On 17 July, as soldiers and  supplies poured into 
A lbany , J o h n s o n  o rd e re d  h is  s e c o n d - in -  
com m and, M ajor-G eneral Ph ineas Lym an, to 
move up  the H udson River approxim ately forty 
m iles an d  estab lish  a fort, la ter nam ed  Fort 
E d w ard  in  h o n o u r  of th e  b ro th e r  of King 
G eorge.16 Jo h n so n  relied heavily on his m uch  
more experienced subord inates like Lym an and 
Eyre. However, while he shou ld  be com m ended 
for practic ing  sou n d  judgem en t by relying on 
these  officers, the  fact rem ains  th a t  he was 
uninform ed in  m ilitary affairs.
Fort E dw ard served as a stag ing  po in t for 
operations against Crown Point. Johnson  arrived 
there  on 14 A ugust an d  departed  soon after, 
travelling n o rth  an o th er eleven m iles u n til he 
r e a c h e d  th e  s o u th e r n  s h o re  of L ake S t. 
Sacram ent on the 28th. With 1500 m en he began 
to co n stru c t a cam p on the  shore  of the  lake 
“w hich he rechristened  Lake George, in  honou r 
of his M ajesty and  to assert his right of dominion 
there .”17 With the arrival of the rest of Jo h n so n ’s 
m en  th e  fo rce  in c lu d e d  3 5 0 0  c o lo n ia ls .18 
H ow ever “d is a p p o in t in g ly  few  I r o q u o i s ” 
answ ered  Jo h n so n ’s call to arm s, estim ates of 
the to tal n u m b er of Iroquois a t Lake George 
rang ing  from ju s t  over 200 to 400 w arrio rs .19 
N either estim ate  seem s to correspond w ith the 
a p p a ren t en th u s ia sm  expressed  by the  Indian  
nations a t M ount Jo h n so n  earlier th a t sum m er. 
Rather, the pessim ism  expressed by the Cayuga 
and  M ohawk tribes during  and  after the M ount 
Jo h n so n  m eeting seem ed to sp read  to the other 
m em bers of the Confederacy.20
In the following weeks the Lake George camp 
teem ed w ith activity. Soldiers cleared the land  
and  set up  shelters, and  a continuous stream  of 
w agons filled w ith supplies, gu n s an d  ba teau x  
flowed into the cam p. However, “there  was little 
drill or train ing  done am id the building, digging
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and  gu ard  duty, though  there  h a d  been  some 
practice in co-ordinating th ree ran k s  to fire and 
re lo ad  w hile giving g ro u n d .”21 T his lim ited  
tra in ing  did little to prepare  J o h n so n ’s force for 
th e  m ix tu re  of g u e rr illa  a n d  c o n v e n tio n a l 
engagem ents they would soon face.
The cam p w as only supposed  to serve as a 
b a se  for po rtag e  o p e ra tio n s  a g a in s t C row n 
Poin t.22 However, Ind ian  sco u ts  soon carried  
in fo rm a tio n  in to  th e  c am p  re v e a lin g  th e  
m ovem ents of a F rench  force of 600 C anadiens, 
600 Indians, an d  200 F rench  regu lars, u n d e r 
the com m and of G eneral B aron de D ieskau .23 
By the  evening of 7 Sep tem ber the  force stood 
w ithin five miles of Fort Edw ard.24 Jo h n so n  sen t 
m essen g ers  so u th  to th e  fort to h e a d  off a 
su rp rise  a ttack  by the  F rench. However, one of 
the  m essengers fell into F rench  h a n d s  and, 
under questioning, told Dieskau th a t unlike Fort 
Edw ard the  cam p a t Lake George lacked bo th  
cannon and  an  adequate breastwork, leaving the 
g rea ter p a rt  of the B ritish  forces in  the  region 
vulnerable to a ttack . This inform ation, coupled 
with the refusal of the C anadian Indians to move 
against the cannon  of Fort Edw ard, led D ieskau 
to move aga in st Lake George in stead .25
D ieskau’s force tu rned  north  on the m orning 
of 8 Sep tem ber and  m arched  for Lake George. 
T h a t sam e m orning Jo h n so n  held  a council of 
war. Following the advice of the Mohawk Sachem  
H endrick , th e  w ar council decided  a g a in s t 
dividing the B ritish force and  in stead  sen t 1000 
m en  u n d e r the  com m and of Colonel E phriam  
W illiams and  200 Iroquois u n d e r H endrick to 
reinforce Fort Edward, which was still assum ed  
to be the  m ain  target of the  F ren ch .26 An ho u r 
a fte r  th e  d e p a rtu re  of re in fo rcem en t force, 
Jo h n so n  recalled th a t “we heard  a  heavy firing, 
and  all the m arks of a w arm  engagem ent, which 
we judged  w as ab o u t th ree  or four m iles from 
u s .”27 French scouts had  spotted the British force 
moving so u th  on the  road  to Fort Edw ard and  
c a p ita lize d  on  th is  g o lden  o p p o r tu n ity  by 
preparing  an  a m b u sh .28 According to D ieskau’s 
plan,
th e  B ritish  w ou ld  w alk  p a s t  th e  A m erin d ian s, 
p a s t th e  m ilitiam en, righ t u p  to th e  regu lars. The 
r e g u l a r s  w o u ld  o p e n  f ire  f i r s t .  T h e n  th e
m ilitiam en  w ould  a tta c k  from  th e  s id es  a n d  th e  
A m erin d ian s  w ou ld  sw eep  ac ro s s  th e  en em y  
rea r.29
However, due to w hat D ieskau described as the 
“m om ent of treachery ,”30 the British m anaged a 
relatively successful retreat back to Lake George. 
The C an ad ian  C aughnaw aga cousin s of the 
Iroquois h ad  hoped to avert a conflict w ith their 
b re th ren  w hom  they  spo tted  a t the  head  of the 
B r i t is h  fo rce . A cco rd in g  to  D ie s k a u , th e  
C aughnaw aga “show ed them selves before the 
tim e and  did no t fire,” giving a large segm ent of 
the British force w ith sufficient w arning to effect 
a speedy  re tre a t .31 For m any, however, the  
w arn ing  cam e too late. The ensu ing  encoun ter 
between the Caughnaw aga and  Iroquois nations 
“w as clearly  a n  u n expected  acciden t w hich 
n e ither h ad  tim e to avert.”32
The Iroquois in particu lar suffered a terrible 
blow in th is  first engagem ent w hen H endrick, 
the  great M ohawk leader and  close friend of 
Jo h n so n , h a d  h is horse  sh o t o u t from u n d e r 
him  and  was stabbed  to death  w ith a bayonet.33 
According to w itnesses “all Indian officers, and  
the Indians say forty of their people, who fought 
like lions, were all s la in .”34 Iroquois m orale
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would no t recover from these initial losses, and  
as a  resu lt their participation  for the rem ainder 
of the ba ttle  w as m inim al.
After the speedy British retreat into the camp 
a t Lake George an d  the  erection of a m akeshift 
b rea s tw o rk  a n d  the  p lac e m e n t of c a n n o n s  
a ro u n d  the perim eter, a second engagem ent 
began later the sam e m orning.35 Dieskau’s troops 
followed the retreat closely b u t were stopped 150 
yards from  the  cam p. For the  next five h o u rs  
French m usket fire covered the cam p. However, 
because  the F rench  m usketeers  could do little 
d am ag e  from  s u c h  a d is ta n c e , “th e ir  fire 
g radually  grew feeble.”36 M eanwhile, C ap tain  
E y re  p ro v e d  h is  e n o rm o u s  v a lu e  to  th e  
expedition w ith h is com petent d irection of the 
cannon  fire w hich “m ade Lanes, S tree ts  and  
Alleys th ro ’ their arm y.”37 Johnson , on the other 
han d , w as confined to h is te n t from the early 
stages of the second engagement after he received 
a  bu lle t in h is thigh. He claim ed in h is official 
report of the battle  th a t the Indians participated  
actively in  the  p u rsu it  of the  F rench. However, 
for the m ost p art, the  Iroquois w aited a t a  safe 
distance until victory was assured. Once assured  
of victory the  Iroquois, “enraged  by their own 
losses, they scalped and  p lundered, slaying the 
w ounded and  helpless, as  the F rench  defeat 
becam e a ro u t.”38 In reality the deciding factor 
a t the B attle of Lake George w as no t Jo h n so n ’s 
influence over the Iroquois, b u t the  superio r 
B ritish  n u m b ers  and  the com petent work of 
Jo h n so n ’s subord ina tes.39
Jo h n so n  also failed to convince h is Iroquois 
allies to s tay  for the  com pletion of the  Crown 
Point expedition. On 12 Septem ber, th ree  days 
after the battle, the M ohawk (Lower Castle) and  
O neida S achem s told Jo h n so n  they p lanned  to 
re tu rn  hom e “for a little while an d  chear [sic] 
ou r people” which is “our constan t custom  after 
an  Engagement in which we have m any losses.”40 
The M ohawk w om en also opposed their m en 
re tu rn in g  to Lake George b ecause  of the  heavy 
losses they h ad  already  suffered; they  believed 
th a t  th e ir hom e castles needed to be p ro tected  
aga in st the  expected re ta lia tion  by C an ad a ’s 
native allies.41 Even though  the Iroquois had  
earlier agreed to participate in the expedition to 
its  com pletion, b a ttle  lo sses an d  trad itio n s  
p rec lu d ed  th e ir  fu r th e r  involvem ent in  the  
campaign.
In the  w ake of the  B ritish  victory a t Lake 
George, two influential accoun ts  of the battle , 
Johnson’s own and one prepared by his assistan t 
Peter Wraxell, p erpe tuated  a m yth of Jo h n so n ’s 
role in  the  engagem ent.42 Both gloss over the 
se rio u sn ess  of the  w ound he su s ta in ed  in  the 
first h o u r of the  engagem ent w hich forced him  
to rem ain  in  h is ten t for the  rem ainder of the 
battle. The accounts also fail to m ention General 
P h ineas Lym an. Lym an assu m ed  com m and of 
the  arm y after Jo h n so n ’s in jury  and, according 
to  C olonel J o h n  R a n s la ir  of A lbany, even 
Jo h n so n  “ascribed  the honou r of the victory” to 
h im .43 Finally, the  accoun ts  give the  Iroquois a 
g rea t deal of credit for the victory, even though  
th e ir con tribu tion  to the  B ritish  effort after the 
early m orning  a m b u sh  w as m inim al an d  their 
e a rly  d e p a r tu r e  p la c e d  th e  C ro w n  P o in t 
expedition in jeopardy. B ecause Jo h n so n  relied 
on the Iroquois (especially the  M ohawks) for 
scouting operations, with their departure he was 
less willing to take offensive risk s .44 As a result, 
Crown Point w as no t cap tu red  and  Jo h n so n ’s 
prestige, w hich relied largely on the  actions of 
h is Iroquois friends, could have suffered if no t 
for these  lopsided battle  accounts. In the event, 
the  Jo h n so n  m yth sp read  widely th ro u g h o u t 
North Am erica an d  G reat Britain.
In early 1756 Jo h n so n  still seem ed to have 
considerab le  influence w ith the  Iroquois. In 
February  of th a t  year, despite  the  losses they 
suffered only m onths earlier at Lake George, 586 
Iro q u o is  a t te n d e d  a  c o n fe ren ce  a t  M oun t 
Johnson .45 However, w hen the war began to tu rn  
against the British, m any Iroquois began to ally 
w ith the  French. The British woes can be partly  
a ttr ib u ted  to the d ism al m ilitary cam paigns of 
com m anders Loudoun, Webb, and  Abercrom by 
betw een 1756 and  1758.46 The British situa tion  
began to improve only after William Pitt becam e 
Prime M inister of G reat Britain. He energetically 
com m itted his governm ent to the w ar effort and 
a p p ro p ria te d  th e  fu n d s  n e c e ssa ry  to m ake 
victory possible. M eanwhile in France, a  failed 
w heat crop m eant th a t fewer goods for trade with 
the  Indian  allies of the  F rench  could be se n t to 
N orth America. A B ritish  b lockade of F rench  
supp ly  sh ip s fu rth e r reduced  the bargain ing  
power of F rench  trad ers  and  negotiators. Some 
confiscated  F rench  goods were even u sed  by 
Jo h n so n  “to p e rsu ad e  the  Iroquois and  o ther 
Indian nations to side w ith the B ritish.”47 In th is
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way the B ritish  regained  som e of the  leverage 
recently lost in their dealings w ith the  Iroquois.
T he  B r i t is h  fo rc e s  in  N o rth  A m erica  
m eanw hile  b eg an  to acco m p lish  im p o rta n t 
m ilitary objectives. The alm ost s im u ltaneous 
cap tu re  of Forts F ron tenac  an d  L ouisbourg by 
C aptain Jo h n  B radstreet and  M ajor-General Sir 
Jeffery A m herst respectively in 1758 “h it the 
F rench  like a th u n d erb o lt” and  “deprived them  
of any  initiative for cam paigns th a t  year. ” The 
F rench  also abandoned  Fort D uquesne, w hich 
Brigadier-G eneral Jo h n  Forbes occupied on 25 
November.48 These victories helped  Jo h n so n  in 
his negotiations w ith the Iroquois. From  22 Ju ly  
to 1 A ugust 1758 he “w as accom plishing and  
Confirm ing the peace betw een the  Six Nations, 
th e  C h ero k ees  a n d  th e  C a ta w b a s .”49 More 
im portantly , in April of the  nex t year Jo h n so n  
held a conference a t Canajoharie with ten  Indian 
nations. He informed those p resen t th a t the new 
C om m ander-in-C hief of the  N orth A m erican 
forces, G eneral Jeffrey A m herst, in tended  to 
open  a cam p aig n  a g a in s t th e  F ren ch . The 
cam paign  included  a  p lanned  invasion of the 
F rench  fort a t  N iagara, a  vital depot in  the 
continental trade system . Am herst, according to 
Jo h n so n , “inform ed me to u se  all my influence 
to engage as m any Indians as  I possibly can, and 
a id  a n d  a s s is t  His M ajesty ’s A rm s, in  the  
O perations of the ensu ing  C am paign .”50 Three 
days la ter on 21 April, “th ree  sachem s w aited 
upon  Sir William an d  his party  to say  th a t  all 
the N ations in  council h ad  concurred  in urging 
the Niagara cam paign to be undertaken  as soon 
as possib le .”51 Jo h n so n  obtained  a  pledge of 
Iroquois participation in  the upcoming campaign 
aga in st the  F rench  an d  confidently reported  to 
A m herst th a t over 800 Ind ians p lan n ed  to jo in  
the expedition aga inst N iagara.52 However, ju s t  
as a t Lake George nearly  four years earlier, 
events a t Fort N iagara revealed th a t  the  full 
c o o p e ra tio n  of th e  Iro q u o is  w ou ld  n o t be 
forthcoming.
The B ritish  governm ent p lanned  a th ree ­
pronged  cam paign aga in st the  F rench  in  the 
sum m er of 1759. The Fort N iagara expedition 
would be crucial because its capture would sever 
the  fu r-p u rch as in g  a reas  in  the  w est from the 
e aste rn  m arke ts  and  “facilitate a  th ru s t  a t the 
C anadian heartland  a t M ontreal and  Q uebec.”53 
As u s u a l Jo h n s o n  a n d  h is  Iroquois friends 
hoped th a t a  successful British expedition would
benefit them  commercially a t the expense of their 
com petitors. In a letter to G eneral A m herst, 
Jo h n so n  declared:
I am  of th e  O p in ion  th e  R ed u c tio n  of N iagara
will O verse t th e  w hole F re n c h  In d ia n  In te res t,
a n d  T rad e , a n d  th ro w  it in to  O u r h a n d s , if th e
C o n q u e s t is p ro p erly  im proved .54
T he F o rt N iag a ra  e x p e d itio n  d e p a r te d  
Oswego on 1 July, travelling along the sou the rn  
shore of Lake Ontario in whaleboats and bateaux 
stocked w ith stores, w eapons, an d  soldiers. On 
6 Ju ly  the  force se ttled  into a creek abou t four 
m iles from  the  fo rt.55 J o h n s o n  o rdered  h is  
Indians to move forward, sp read  out, and  scout 
the  a rea , “b eh in d  w hich th e  B ritish  landed  
quietly and efficiently, unloading heavy gear and 
cannon .”56
The British force included the 44 th  and  46th  
Regim ents of Foot, the 4 th  Battalion of the 60th  
Regiment of Foot (Royal American), the New York 
Provincials, a n d  a d e tach m en t of th e  Royal 
A rtillery. B rig ad ie r-G en era l J o h n  P rid eau x  
com m anded, Colonel Jo h n  Jo h n s to n  served as 
second-in-com m and, and  William Jo h n so n  led 
a de tachm en t of 900 Iroquois, nearly  one-th ird  
of the 3000-strong  B ritish force.57 They would 
face a fort th a t was recently s treng thened  by its 
co m m an d er, G en e ra l P ie rre  P o u ch o t, w ho 
co m m a n d ed  a g a rr iso n  of 486  m en: “ 149 
regu lars from the  regim ents of La Sarre , Royal 
Roussillon, G uienne and  Bearn; 183 colonials; 
133 m ilitiam en; and  21 g u n n ers  ... th u s  it was 
indeed a form idable fort w hich the English had  
to conquer.”58
As the  B ritish  force d isem barked , F rench  
sc o u ts  rep o rted  sp o ttin g  “20 b a rg e s , each  
containing 20 men, who were a t once considered 
the van -guard  of the English arm y .” Pouchot 
acted  quickly to coun ter the apparen t invasion, 
sending couriers to the French forts a t M achault 
and  Detroit calling for reinforcem ents. He then  
se n t the corvette L ’lroquoise into Lake O ntario 
w ith a m on th ’s provisions and  orders to h a ra ss  
the B ritish  force w ith cannon  fire.59 On 9 Ju ly  
P rideaux, em phasizing  th a t  superio r B ritish 
n um bers  m ade F rench  resistance  futile, sen t a 
m essenger into Fort N iagara proposing th a t the 
French su rrender peacefully. Pouchot, however, 
believed th a t his garrison, the improved defences 
of the fort, and  the su b stan tia l store of supplies 
w ould be enough to hold off the B ritish  un til
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A plan of the siege of Fort Niagara produced in honour of Sir William Johnson following the surrender of the fort. The title 
of engraving, Plan of Niagara, with the Adjacent Country, Surrendered to the English Army under the Command of Sr. 
William Johnson, Bard, on the 25th of July 1759, provides insight into one of the ways by which the Johnson myth spread 
throughout the British Empire. (Engraved by Godhart De Bruls, New York, 1762)
reinforcements arrived from the west. He refused 
to su rre n d e r  an d  on the n igh t of 9 Ju ly  the 
B ritish  formally began  siege operations.
G eneral Prideaux p lanned  h is siege based  
on the tene ts  of seven teen th -cen tu ry  m ilitary 
engineer and  a rch itec t Sebastien  le P restre de 
V auban (1633-1707),60 and  retained the services 
of m asons, sawyers, bricklayers, wheel-wrights, 
cutlers, carpen ters, tu rn e rs , b lack sm iths, gun 
sm iths, ten t sm iths, and  others. To conduct an  
effective siege “all of these skills would be needed 
... an d  the form ation of su c h  m en  into special 
w ork g roups w as a suggestion  of V au b an .” 
V auban also prom oted trench  warfare as a form 
of siege craft th a t could preven t unnecessa ry  
bloodshed for the a ttackers:
T he w o rk m en  w ere to  beg in  a  long  tre n c h , o r 
sap , previously laid ou t by the  engineers, slan ting  
to w ard  th e  fo rt a t  a n  ang le  ob lique  en o u g h  to 
allow  th e  m en  in  th e  tr e n c h e s  to  b e  sh e lte re d  
fro m  th e  d e f e n d e r s ’ f ire . T h e  e a r t h  t h u s  
e x c a v a te d  w a s  p iled  w ith  th e  fa s c in e s  a n d  
g ab io n s  on  th e  side  of th e  tre n c h  to w ard  th e  
enem y. By th u s  zig-zagging tow ard  th e  fort, th e
b ese ig e rs  co u ld  ad v an ce  close en o u g h  to  r isk  
s to rm in g  th e  w a lls .61
Following the first night of tren ch  work on 9-10 
Ju ly , the British had  moved to w ithin 640 yards 
of the  fort.82
Meanwhile Jo h n so n  h ad  problem s retaining 
the allegiance of his Indian force. During the first 
week of the  siege Ind ian  leaders from n a tions  
a llied  to  b o th  th e  B ritish  a n d  th e  F re n c h  
a ttem pted  to convince each  o ther to w ithdraw  
from the  conflict:
Two Six N ations legates w ere ad m itted  in to  F ort 
N ia g a ra , w h e re  th e y  a n d  s e v e ra l  S e n e c a , 
M ississauga, O ttaw a, a n d  Potaw atom i d iscussed  
th e  m is fo r tu n e  of A m e rin d ia n s  fig h tin g  one  
an o th e r . T hey  a lso  le a rn e d  of th e  im p en d in g  
re lief force ex p ec ted  from  F o rt M ach au lt. A fter 
th e  leg a tes  re tu rn e d  to  th e  B ritish  cam p , all of 
th e  S ix  N ations Iroquo is su d d e n ly  d ec ided  to 
w ith d raw  from  th e  siege .63
By 13 Ju ly  the  Indian  allies of the B ritish  had  
moved up  the  N iagara River, to a site nam ed  La 
Belle Famille, to escape the chaos of the  siege.
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They had  been uncomfortable about being placed 
in  a vu lnerable position; they  served as  scou ts  
an d  screens in  advanced  positions, an d  were 
therefore located directly in the line of fire. Their 
d ep a rtu re  “took away m uch  of the  screen  th a t 
had  so closely hem m ed the French in on the land 
side an d  allowed the  F rench  to lea rn  m ore of 
the English activities.”64 Once again, Jo h n so n ’s 
Iroquois allies h a d  refused to com m it fully to 
the B ritish  battle  plan . In stead  they conducted  
separate diplomatic negotiations with the Indian 
allies of the  F rench  an d  u ltim ately  determ ined  
w hen  an d  how  th e ir resou rces w ould be m ade 
available to the B ritish side.
The B ritish  leaders did little to im pede the 
nego tia tions an d  in stead  u se d  th e  period of 
uncertain ty  to advance the trench-w ork further. 
By 20 Ju ly  the trenches had  moved forward over 
500 m eters, to w ith in  100 m eters of the  fort. 
The B ritish  force nex t w orked to w eaken the 
fort’s defences by increasing  artillery fire. Then 
d is a s te r  s t ru c k  th e  B ritish . C olonel J o h n  
Johnston , the expedition’s second-in-com m and, 
w as killed by m usket fire. An h o u r later General 
P rideaux was h it by the d ischarge from  one of 
h is own m ortars . The shell severed h is head. 
J o h n s o n  now  s te p p e d  in to  th e  le a d e rsh ip  
vacuum  to assum e com m and of the  siege. A 
feeling of d ism ay sw ept th rough  the  regu lars in 
the B ritish  force. L ieu tenan t Colonel M assey 
objected to Jo h n so n ’s prom otion because he felt 
th a t  he h a d  been  a ssu re d  of h is seniority  over 
Jo h n so n  by m ilitary  au th o rities  p rio r to the 
departure  of the expedition. O ther regulars were 
simply uncom fortable with Johnson  a t the helm.
Eighteenth-century m ilitary strategist John Muller 
acknowledged the pre-eminence of Vauban in the field of 
siegecraft. This sketch of a besieged fortress by Muller 
clearly reveals the influence of Vauban. (In John Muller, 
The Attack and Defence of Fortified Places, London: J. 
Millan, 1765)
M ost probably  viewed him  as “a very good and  
valuable m an, b u t u tterly  a s tranger to m ilitary 
affairs,” an d  particu larly  unfam iliar w ith the  
m ulti-faceted aspects of a  siege.65 Despite strong 
an d  vocal opposition, however, Jo h n so n  moved 
the  siege forward.
M uch to h is credit, he followed P rideaux’s 
ba ttle  plan . By 23 Ju ly  the  defences of the  fort 
h a d  deterio ra ted  significantly. The s tru c tu re s  
holding the French cannons in place were blown 
away by artillery  fire an d  the  F rench  m uskets  
h ad  broken down to the point where only abou t 
100 of them  worked, and  m ost of them  were 
w ith o u t b ay o n e ts . A ccording to th e  official 
F rench jo u rn a l of the siege only one out of every 
ten  French arm s was serviceable, despite the fact 
t h a t  “s e v e n  s m i th s  o r a r m o u r e r s  w ere  
continually  employed to repair them .” However, 
word cam e to Pouchot th a t m orning  th a t the 
reinforcements he had  called for, 600 French and 
1,000 Indian fighters, were approaching .66
U n fo rtu n a te ly  for P o u ch o t, th e  B ritish  
intercepted m essengers sent forward by the relief 
force and  learned of its approach. Jo h n so n  sen t 
C aptain  DeLancey (the son of Jam es  DeLancey, 
Governor of New York) w ith 150 light in fan try  
to La Belle Famille, where a British detachm ent 
w as already  waiting. The M ohawks, the m ost 
loyal Ind ian  allies of the  B ritish  and  the  only 
Iroquois still willing to fight, negotiated with their 
F rench Indian coun terparts  one last time b u t to 
no avail.67 The 24 Ju ly  engagem ent a t La Belle 
Famille lasted  less th an  an  ho u r and  the British 
ro u t of the  F rench  relief force sealed  the  fate of 
Fort Niagara. Jo h n so n  next called on Pouchot 
to surrender. After the disillusioned com m ander 
w as a ssu re d  by h is officers th a t  the relief force 
h ad  been defeated, he assessed  the condition of 
the supplies and  the fortifications and  concluded 
th a t fu rther resistance was useless. On 25 Ju ly  
Pouchot form ally su rren d e red  Fort N iagara to 
Johnson .
Once again  the lau re ls  of victory fell to Sir 
William Johnson . T hroughout the colonies, and
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British sap and numerous batteries. (Mary Rocque, A set of Plans and Forts in North America, London, 1763)
especially in  New York, “the  to as t of the  day ... 
w as ‘Jo h n so n  forever!”’68 A lthough Jo h n so n  
shou ld  receive m uch  of the credit for the defeat 
of the F rench  relief force a t La Belle Famille, as 
well as for h is decision to follow P rideaux’s w ar 
p lans, de trac to rs  began  to c lam our for a more 
even-handed  app ra isa l of h is ac tu a l role a t the 
siege of Fort N iagara. By the  tim e Jo h n so n  
assu m ed  com m and of the siege, Prideaux h ad  
already  b rough t it to the verge of victory. With 
the B ritish  forces only 100 yards away as the 
defences of Fort N iagara stead ily  crum bled , 
victory over the  F rench  w as inevitable. Some 
regu lar officers who h a d  opposed Jo h n so n ’s 
prom otion  con tinued  to q u estio n  h is ac tu a l 
con tribu tion  to the  victory. Nearly a  year after 
the battle . L ieu tenan t Colonel M assey reported  
several inconsistenc ies in  J o h n s o n ’s official 
report of the siege to Prime M inister William Pitt. 
In a s ta tem en t m ean t to dispel the  m yth th a t 
J o h n s o n ’s I ro q u o is  a l l ie s  c o n t r ib u te d  
significantly to the B ritish  effort a t N iagara, 
M assey declared:
d a s t a r d ly  to  ta k e  t h a t  H o n o u r , w h ic h  is  
deserved ly  d u e , to  s u c h  of h is  M ajesty ’s T roops 
a s  w as in  th a t  A ction, a n d  to  w ho, sh o u 'd  I 
ex p la in  th is  fa c t to , b u t  to  y o u r E xcellency, so 
re m a rk a b le  for rew a rd in g  M erit.69
M assey w as no t sim ply a  d isg run tled  regu lar 
officer la sh in g  o u t a g a in s t J o h n s o n  as  the  
recipient of the laurels of victory. In fact, Massey’s 
appraisal of the  Iroquois role in the siege of Fort 
Niagara was accurate. On 12 Ju ly  1759, the third 
day of the  siege, the  Iroquois decam ped to La 
Belle Famille, where they awaited the conclusion 
of hostilities. T hroughout the  expedition they 
negotiated  w ith the  Ind ian  allies of the  F rench  
in order to avoid partic ipa ting  in the  conflict. 
Finally, all the Iroquois allies, except for a sm all 
num ber of the m ost loyal Mohawks, stayed clear 
of the engagem ent a t La Belle Famille. However, 
“as soon as the  F rench  began  to re trea t, all the 
Iroquois who had  been wavering on the sidelines 
were off in hot p u rsu it with tom ahaw ks and long 
k n iv es , w h o o p in g  a n d  sc re a m in g  a s  th ey  
bu tchered  the stragglers.”70
...a s  I h e a r  th e  In d ian s  have got g re a t C redit, by 
th a t day, in  Europe, I th in k  I sh o u ’d n o t do ju s tice  
to th e  Regim ent, I have the  H onour to C om m and, 
if I w o u ’d allow  sav ag es , w ho  b e h a v ’d  m o s t
Following the su rre n d e r  of Fort N iagara, 
Johnson  composed a battle report which Francis 
J e n n in g s  d e s c r ib e s  a s  “a m a s te rp ie c e  of
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A sketch of Fort Niagara made in 1758, one year before 
the fateful battle in which the French surrendered the fort 
to the British. Notice the fort is already adorned with the 
British Union flag. (Published n Royal Magazine, London, 
September 1759)
am biguity .”71 He p laced h im self a t the  head  of 
the  B ritish  force a t La Belle Fam ille w hen in 
rea lity  he  rem a in ed  a t h is  com m and  post. 
N um erous officers did n o t receive cred it for 
ro u tin g  th e ir  F ren ch  adversa ries , includ ing  
L ieu tenan t Colonel M assey an d  C ap ta in  De 
Lancey.72 In the final analysis, although Johnson  
sh o u ld  be c red ited  for g a in in g  s u b s ta n t ia l  
Iroquois support for the initial stages of the siege, 
for following the ba ttle  p lan  of h is u n fo rtu n a te  
predecessor, and  for succeeding to convince the 
hesitan t regulars to accept his leadership, he had 
little influence over the actions of h is Iroquois 
detachm ent during  the siege.
S ir William Jo h n so n  h a s  been  hailed  as a 
great m ilitary leader by n u m ero u s b iographers 
who more often th a n  no t relied on questionable 
sou rces to reach  their conclusions. D uring his 
early years as  an  en trep ren eu r in  the  M ohawk 
Valley and  elsewhere, Jo h n so n  developed sound 
r e la t io n s h ip s  w ith  th e  I ro q u o is  N a tio n s , 
especially the M ohawks. In time, and  m ost often 
du ring  periods of m ilitary  crisis, the  B ritish  
colonial governm ent tu rn ed  to Jo h n so n  to gain 
Iroquois support against the French. His role a t 
Lake George in  1755 and  Fort N iagara in  1759, 
however, revealed th a t h is harm onious relations 
w ith the Iroquois did no t necessarily  tran s la te  
into their wholehearted participation on the field 
of battle . At bo th  Lake George and  Fort N iagara 
th e  Iro q u o is  N a tio n s  m a in ta in e d  s e p a ra te  
diplom atic channels  w ith the F rench  and  their 
C anadian Indian allies. The Iroquois also seldom 
conform ed to the  roles Jo h n so n  hoped  they 
would in battle. Finally, population estim ates for
the  period suggest th a t Jo h n so n  did no t fully 
ta p  th e  fig h tin g  re s o u rc e s  of th e  Iroquo is  
Confederacy. The ability of the Iroquois to dictate 
th e  ex te n t of th e ir  p a rtic ip a tio n  in  B ritish  
m ilita ry  c a m p a ig n s  re v e a ls  th e ir  re la tiv e  
in d ep en d en ce  in  th is  period . A lthough  the  
m ain tenance  of Iroquois n eu tra lity  could be 
viewed as a success in and  of itself, Jo h n so n ’s 
rep u ta tio n  rested  on the  p resum ption  th a t  h is 
Iroquois allies would fight in battle on the British 
side. In reality, the reluctance of the Iroquois to 
partic ipa te  in ba ttle  on B ritish  term s, coupled 
with Jo h n so n ’s inexperience and dependence on 
others in conventional and  guerrilla operations, 
r a i s e s  le g i t im a te  d o u b ts  c o n c e rn in g  h is  
rep u ta tio n  as a great m ilitary leader during  the 
Seven Years War.
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